Results of the US presidential election have cast a shadow on the future of collective climate action. COP29 can be a turning point if the rest of the international community steps up to fill the leadership gap and keep climate finance on track
The 29th Conference of Parties (COP29) in Baku, Azerbaijan, has been billed as the “finance” COP, with the spotlight on finalising the new collective quantified goal (NCQG). The NCQG is expected to set an ambitious climate finance target that goes beyond the previous $100bn benchmark, ensuring predictable funding for developing countries' climate actions. However, the recent US presidential election result, with Donald Trump winning, casts a shadow over these negotiations.
Trump’s return has reignited fears among climate scientists, researchers and global stakeholders. His previous term (2017-2021) was marked by significant climate policy rollbacks, including the withdrawal from the Paris Agreement—a move he has vowed to repeat. Trump’s recent campaign emphasised a pro-fossil fuel agenda, advocating for more oil drilling and slashing investments in clean energy, such as the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA). This could lead to an estimated additional 4bn tonnes of carbon dioxide emissions by 2030 compared to US president Joe Biden’s current trajectory.
The shift in US leadership is likely to disrupt the progress of climate finance agreements at COP29. Trump's skepticism toward climate action and potential withdrawal from international climate frameworks could weaken US involvement in crucial discussions and agreements, including the NCQG. Without US support, pushing for ambitious climate finance contributions will be difficult, dampening momentum among developing countries and potentially stalling commitments from other major contributors.
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Articles 2 and 9 of the Paris Agreement are central to climate finance discussions, underscoring the need to align financial flows with pathways that support low-carbon, climate-resilient development. Originating from the 2009 Copenhagen Accord, developed countries committed to providing $30bn in "new and additional" financial resources for 2010-2012 and agreed to mobilise $100bn annually by 2020. Building from a $100bn floor, the NCQG was set for establishment ahead of 2025, reflecting the needs and priorities of developing countries.
Despite the guiding principles of predictability, effectiveness, additionality, fairness and intergenerational equity, reaching a consensus on the NCQG remains challenging. After 11 technical expert dialogues and three ad hoc meetings, deep divisions persist on key issues. Some countries support a single, unified target, while others propose a layered approach with annual targets across various climate action areas. This debate, alongside differing preferences for five- or 10-year timelines and alignment with nationally determined contributions (NDCs) and biennial transparency reports (BTRs), adds layers of complexity.
The NCQG must reflect the growing needs of developing nations and surpass the $100bn benchmark, which represents more of a political compromise than actual financial needs. As financing requirements are projected in the trillions annually, the NCQG should address this scale, with specific targets for mitigation, adaptation and loss and damage. This would also help redress the current imbalance, where mitigation receives the majority of funding, leaving adaptation and loss and damage underfunded.
Adding specific targets for short-lived climate pollutants (SLCPs) could further balance efforts across critical climate areas. Fast mitigation of SLCPs can significantly curbs heat stress and temperature rise. These measures alongside decarbonisation are important, since the planet is moving towards a temperature increase of 2.6-3.1 degrees Celsius over the course of this century. This way, the NCQG can address the current imbalance and ensure that resources aren’t diverted from one critical climate area to cover another.
The NCQG should emphasise public, grant-based financing over loans. Under Trump’s administration, efforts to redirect funds from public climate commitments to domestic priorities could rise, further stressing the importance of reliable finance from other developed countries. Adopting a fair-share approach that upholds the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities (CBDR-RC) will be vital. Developed nations must contribute in line with their historical emissions and economic capacity, a challenge heightened by the uncertainty surrounding US engagement.
For climate finance to be effective, it must supplement—not replace—official development assistance (ODA). Innovative tax strategies, such as those on shipping emissions and fossil fuel profits, can help generate the necessary funds without sacrificing progress in other critical sectors like health and education. Trump’s policy stance, however, risks reversing gains in climate funding mobilisation and undercuts international solidarity, placing greater responsibility on Europe and willing allies.
The NCQG must prioritise accessible and inclusive finance, particularly for small island developing states (SIDS) and least developed countries (LDCs). Simplifying procedures and offering direct funding can reduce reliance on intermediaries and improve timely access. Women, who are disproportionately affected by climate change, must be central to these efforts. Finance programmes should actively support women’s resilience, leadership and economic empowerment, incorporating gender analysis in projects and transparent gender equality metrics. Building institutional capacity for effective fund management at the grassroots level can enable support for local women's organisations.
With COP29 poised to be a turning point, decisive, collective action is essential to uphold global climate ambitions. Trump’s return threatens to derail these efforts, underscoring the need for a robust, multilateral framework that can withstand political fluctuations. While the setback is significant, the international community must push forward, with Europe, China, and subnational US actors stepping up to fill the leadership gap and keep climate finance on track.
(The authors are director of the India Programme at Institute for Governance & Sustainable Development (ISGD) and chief of staff at IGSD, India respectively.)